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Denying journalist access to asylum-seeker ‘reception centre’ in Hungary violated 
Article 10 ECHR 
 
Dirk Voorhoof and Ronan Ó Fathaigh 
 
In Szurovecz v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights has held that a refusal to grant 
a journalist access to an asylum-seeker ‘reception centre’ in Hungary violated his right to 
freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. The ECtHR emphasised that newsgathering, 
including ‘first-hand’ observation by a journalist reporting on a matter of significant public 
interest, is an essential part of journalistic research and press freedom. The ECtHR found that 
the public interest in reporting from certain locations is especially relevant where the 
authorities’ handling of vulnerable groups is at stake, and the presence of media is a guarantee 
that the authorities can be held to account for their conduct. 
 
Facts 
 
In 2015, the Hungarian journalist Illés Szurovecz, working for the Internet news portal 
abcug.hu, requested access to the Debrecen Reception Centre, a major housing centre for 
asylum-seekers entering Hungary. Szurovecz sought permission to visit the centre in order to 
interview asylum-seekers and take photographs, after serious concerns had been raised about 
their treatment. His request came after a report by the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights 
condemning the living conditions in the centre, amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment 
(see here). Furthermore, the Reception Centre was constantly presented in the State-owned 
media as part of the Government’s anti-immigration campaign. The Office of Immigration and 
Nationality (‘OIN’) however rejected Szurovecz’s request, noting that there was constant media 
interest in asylum-seekers and regular visits to the Reception Centre would infringe their private 
lives. Moreover, many people accommodated in the Reception Centre had fled from some form 
of persecution and information about them appearing in the media could endanger both their 
and their families’ security. Szurovecz appealed, but his action was declared inadmissible as 
the OIN’s decision was not subject to judicial review. 
 
The parties’ submissions 
 
Before the ECtHR, Szurovecz complained that the Hungarian authorities had violated his right 
to impart information under Article 10 ECHR by refusing his request to enter the premises of 
the Debrecen Reception Centre with a view to writing a report on the living conditions of 
asylum-seekers. A coalition of international organisations, including the Media Legal Defence 
Initiative, Index on Censorship and the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, 
supported Szurovecz’s complaint. The third-party intervention emphasised that newsgathering, 
including physical access to the places where important events are developing, is an essential 
component of investigative journalism. 
 
The Hungarian Government argued that the complaint was based on a claim to a right of access 
to information which did not fall within the scope of Article 10 ECHR. It was submitted that 
any right of access to information under Article 10 could be construed only as a right to receive 
information willingly imparted by others: there was only a negative obligation on the part of 
the State not to unjustifiably hinder access to publicly available information and not to punish 
anyone for receiving information from public authorities. 
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Furthermore the Government submitted that should the ECtHR find that Article 10 was 
applicable, access to the Reception Centre had not been necessary for Szurovecz to express his 
opinion on an issue of public interest, since he had had access to information provided by 
international organisations and NGOs, or other alternative sources. And anyway, he could have 
interviewed refugees outside the premises of the Reception Centre and he could have obtained 
photographs taken by others. For these reasons, the Hungarian Government argued that 
Szurovecz’s application should be considered inadmissible ratione materiae and ratione 
personae. In addition, the Government argued that the interference with the right to receive 
information under Article 10 was justified referring to the asylum-seekers’ right to respect for 
private life under Article 8, as well as their right to life, physical integrity and personal liberty 
(Articles 2, 3 and 5 ECHR). 
 
The judgment 
 
The ECtHR disagreed with the Hungarian Government on all points. First it referred to its 
earlier case law according to which the gathering of information is an essential preparatory step 
in journalism and an inherent and protected part of press freedom. The Court reiterates that 
‘obstacles created in order to hinder access to information which is of public interest may 
discourage those working in the media or related fields from pursuing such matters. As a result, 
they may no longer be able to play their vital role as ‘public watchdogs’, and their ability to 
provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected’. The Court found that the 
Hungarian authorities had prevented Szurovecz from gathering information first hand and from 
verifying the information about the conditions of detention provided by other sources. This 
constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression in that it 
hindered a preparatory step prior to publication, that is to say journalistic research (see also 
Dammann v. Switzerland, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, and Schweizerische 
Radio- und Fernseh gesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland). The Government’s objections that 
Szurovecz’s complaint was incompatible ratione materiae and ratione personae with the 
provisions of the Convention was therefore dismissed. 
 
The ECtHR accepted that the interference at issue was prescribed by law and pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting the private lives of asylum-seekers and ‘camp residents’. However, 
in view of the importance of the media in a democratic society and of reporting on matters of 
considerable public interest, the ECtHR considered that the rather summary reasoning put 
forward by the OIN and the absence in its decision of any real balancing of the interests in issue, 
failed to demonstrate convincingly that the refusal of permission to enter and conduct research 
in the Reception Centre was necessary in a democratic society. Especially because the refusal 
was absolute it was not proportionate to the aims pursued and did not meet a ‘pressing social 
need’. 
 
The ECtHR considered the matter of how residents were accommodated in State-run reception 
centres, whether the State fulfilled its international obligations towards asylum-seekers and 
whether this vulnerable group had the ability to fully enjoy their human rights as ‘undisputedly 
newsworthy and of great public significance’. It emphasised that the ‘public interest in reporting 
from certain locations is especially relevant where the authorities’ handling of vulnerable 
groups is at stake. The “watchdog” role of the media assumes particular importance in such 
contexts since their presence is a guarantee that the authorities can be held to account for their 
conduct’. The ECtHR found that the conclusion of the OIN in refusing access to the Reception 
Centre was reached without any sensible consideration of Szurovecz’s interest as a journalist 
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in conducting his research or of the interest of the public in receiving information on a matter 
of public interest.  
 
Although the ECtHR ultimately agreed that the reasons adduced by the OIN relying on the 
safety and private lives of refugees and asylum-seekers were undoubtedly ‘relevant’, it did not 
find them ‘sufficient’ in the light of the necessity test under Article 10 § 2 ECHR. The Court 
also considered that the material Szurovecz intended to gather, although by its very nature 
necessarily touching upon the private lives of others, did not concern information for 
sensationalist or similar purposes, but concerned rather those aspects of the asylum-seekers’ 
lives that were of public interest, in particular their living conditions and their treatment by the 
Hungarian authorities. The ECtHR referred to the fact that Szurovecz explained that he would 
only take photos of individuals who had given their prior consent and, if needed, he would also 
obtain written authorisation from them, while the OIN has not taken any notice of this argument. 
Furthermore, neither the OIN nor the Government have indicated in what respect the safety of 
asylum-seekers would have been jeopardised in practice by the proposed research especially if 
it had taken place only with the consent of the individuals involved. The Court is also of the 
opinion that the existence of other alternatives to direct newsgathering within the Reception 
Centre did not extinguish Szurovecz’s interest in having face-to-face discussions on and gaining 
first-hand impressions of living conditions there. Hence, the availability of other forms and 
tools of research were not sufficient reasons to justify the interference complained of or to 
remedy the prejudice caused by the refusal of authorisation to enter the Reception Centre. 
Finally, there was no legal possibility or judicial review open to Szurovecz to argue for the 
necessity of his access to the Reception Centre in order to exercise his right to impart 
information.  
 
The Court accepted that the domestic authorities are better placed than it is to say whether, and 
to what extent, access to the Reception Centre is compatible with the authorities’ obligation to 
protect the rights of asylum-seekers. However, in view of the importance of the media in a 
democratic society and of reporting on matters of considerable public interest, the ECtHR 
considers that the need for restrictions on freedom of expression must be convincingly 
established, and that in this case the domestic authorities have failed to demonstrate 
convincingly that the refusal of permission to enter and conduct research in the Reception 
Centre, which was an absolute refusal, was proportionate to the aims pursued and thus met a 
pressing social need. The Court unanimously concluded that Article 10 ECHR has been 
violated. 
 
Comment 
 
The unanimous judgment is not only a victory for Szurovecz, but is also a strategic victory for 
the third-party interveners, and European journalists and media organisations generally. It 
should serve a powerful precedent for journalists throughout Europe seeking access to asylum-
seeker detention centres, and other immigration detention camps. Importantly, it should be 
noted that it is not just the Hungarian government that restricts media access to such detention 
centres, but as detailed by Reporters Without Borders, journalists are routinely ‘denied access 
to migrant detention centres almost everywhere in Europe’, including France, Italy, Spain and 
Greece (see here, here). Broadcasters such as Euronews and the BBC have reported on how 
media have been ‘excluded for over two years’ from the ‘horrific’ Moria detention camp by the 
Greek government (see here, here). When journalists manage to gain rare access, the reports 
detail the appalling and ‘inhuman’ conditions for thousands of detainees, including many 
unaccompanied children (see Le Monde here, here, and The Guardian here).  
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The Court’s crucial holding was that ‘den[ying] access’ to the detention centre was an 
‘interference’ with the journalist’s freedom of expression, as it ‘prevented him from gathering 
information first hand’ and ‘hindered a preparatory step prior to publication, that is to say 
journalistic research’. The Court is very explicit that the refusal to authorise a journalist to 
conduct interviews and take photos prevented him from gathering information and from 
verifying the information provided by other sources. The Court rightly relied upon its earlier 
judgment in Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft, where it had also found a violation 
of Article 10 over a refusal to allow a Swiss broadcaster film inside a prison and interview a 
detainee; and applied the principle from the Court’s Dammann judgment, that the gathering of 
information is an essential ‘preparatory step in journalism and is an inherent, protected part of 
press freedom’.  
 
It is remarkable, however, that the ECtHR finds authority in Pentikäinen v. Finland, for the 
proposition that the ‘watchdog’ role of the media assumes particular importance since their 
presence is a guarantee that the authorities can be held to account for their conduct at certain 
locations where the authorities’ handling of vulnerable groups is at stake. A majority of the 
Grand Chamber in Pentikäinen, for very specific reasons, did not find a violation of Article 10 
ECHR with regard to the arrest, prosecution and conviction of a journalist who was removed 
by the police from the location where he was reporting on a demonstration that had become 
violent (post here). The majority in Pentikäinen considered that there were other possibilities 
to report about the demonstration:  if the journalist had obeyed the order given by the police to 
leave the cordoned-off area, he could have continued to exercise his professional assignment in 
the immediate vicinity of the cordoned-off area. However now, in Szurovecz, the Court has 
more pertinently emphasised that the ‘existence of other alternatives to direct newsgathering 
within the Reception Centre did not extinguish the applicant’s interest in having face-to-face 
discussions on and gaining first-hand impressions of living conditions there. In those 
circumstances the availability of other forms and tools of research were not sufficient reasons 
to justify the interference complained of or to remedy the prejudice caused by the refusal of 
authorisation to enter the Reception Centre’.  It may have been more appropriate for the Court 
to have relied upon other case law, not cited in Szurovecz, where the Court has effectively 
valued the importance of the media and journalists’ role as ‘watchdog’ being able to be present 
at locations and report about events of public interest; such as Gsell v. Switzerland, where Court 
held a refusal to allow a journalist access to Davos in order to report on the meeting of the 
World Economic Forum was an ‘interference’, and indeed as a violation, of the journalist’s 
freedom of expression (see also Butkevich v. Russia (post here); and Selmani and Others v. the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (post here) and compare with Endy Gęsina-Torres v. 
Poland). 
 
Notably, the Court roundly rejected the Hungarian government’s argument that Article 10 does 
not include a ‘right of access to information’, and that Article 10 only guaranteed a right to 
‘receive information willingly imparted by others’, with only a ‘negative obligation on the part 
of the State not to unjustifiably hinder access to publicly available information’. This position 
taken by the government completely goes against the established case law of the ECtHR over 
the last decade on the issue of access to public documents and the right of newsgathering. The 
argumentation of the Hungarian government is particularly striking given the several occasions 
where Hungary has been found in violation of Article 10 ECHR because of refusing access to 
information requested by journalists or NGOs (see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 
Kenedi v. Hungary, and the Grand Chamber judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. 
Hungary) (post here)). 
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Finally, it is hoped that the Court’s reasoning in Szurovecz can be used as a shield, and help 
bring an end to the threats, intimidation, arrest, prosecution, denial of permits, rejection of 
interview requests, seizure of equipment and deportation, as the methods used by governments 
in Europe to obstruct media coverage of refugees. 
 
 
[Disclosure: Dirk Voorhoof (Human Rights Centre UGent and Legal Human Academy) is also 
a member of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, a third-party intervener in this 
case] 
